It is shown that if there is no bound on the number of faulty processes, then in a precise sense, in a system with unreliable but fair communication, Uniform Distributed Coordination (UDC) can be attained if and only if a system has perfect failure detectors. This result is generalized to the case where there is a bound t on the number of faulty processes. It is shown that a certain type of generalized failure detector is necessary and sufficient for achieving UDC in a context with at most t faulty processes. Reasoning about processes' knowledge as to which other processes are faulty plays a key role in the analysis.
Introduction
Periodically coordinating specific actions among a group of processes is fundamental to most distributed computing problems, and especially to replication schemes that achieve fault tolerance. Unfortunately, as is well known, it is impossible to achieve coordination in an asynchronous setting even if there can be at most one faulty process [FLP85] . This is true even if communication is reliable. As a result, there has been a great deal of interest recently in systems with failure detectors [CT96] , oracles that provide suspicions as to which processes in the system are faulty. This interest is heightened by results of [CT96, CHT96] showing that consensus can be achieved with relatively unreliable failure detectors.
Here we consider what kind of failure detectors are necessary to attain Unifom Distributed Coo&-*This work was supported in part by NSF under grant IRI-96-25901. Pert~ljssion to make digital or hard copies of all or part ofthis work for penonal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies:
arc not made or distributed for profit or commercial advaniage and that q$cs bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. 'fo WPY otherwise. to republish. to post on servers or to RdiStribllte to lists. requires prior specilic permission andior a fee.
ISPD '99 Monterey CA US.4
Copyright ACM 1999 I-581 13-099-9/99/04...$5.00 nation (UDC) [GT89] . We have UDC of action a if, whenever some process (correct or not) performs (Y, then so do all the correct processes. If we have reliable communication, then it is easy to see that we can attain UDC no matter how many processes may fail. Thus, in this setting, UDC is strictly easier than consensus. If communication is unreliable but fair, then we show that we can attain UDC with no bound on the number of process failures in the presence of we& failure detectors, which have the property that eventually every faulty process is permanently suspect by at least one correct process (weals completeness) and at least one correct process is never suspected (weak accuracy). Chandra and Toueg [CT961 showed that consensus with an arbitrary number of failures is also achievable using weak failure detectors. They considered a setting with reliable communication, but their results apply with essentially no change to a setting where communication is unreliable but fair.
Chandra and Toueg observed that by having processes communicate their suspicions, a weak failure detector can be converted to a strong failure detector, which satisfies weak accuracy and strong completeness (all correct processes eventually permanently suspect every faulty process). We further observe that, under a relatively innocuous assumption, in systems with no bound on the number of faulty processes, strong failure detectors are equivalent to perfect failure detectors, which satisfy strong completeness and strong accumcy-no process is suspected until it crashes. These results tell us that we can attain UDC if there is no bound on failures using what are effectively equivalent to perfect failure detectors. Are perfect failure detectors really necessary? We show that in a precise sense they are. Under quite minimal assump tions, a system that attains UDC with no bounds on the number of failures can implement perfect failure detectors.' It is interesting to note that S&per and Sandoz' Uniform Reliable Multicast [SS93] is a special case of UDC where the only action of interest ' We remark that our notion of "implement" is stronger than the notion of reduction used in [CTOB, CHTSB] ; see Section 3.
is reliable message delivery. Schiper and Sandoz implement Uniform Reliable Multicast by using the Isis virtual synchrony model [BJ87] , which simulates perfect failure detection. Our results support their need to implement it in this way.
What happens if there is a bound on the number of faulty processes? Gopal and Toueg (GT89] show that UDC is achievable with no failure detectors if less than half the processes can be faulty. Here we generalize these results, providing a generalized failure detector that we can show is necessary and sufficient to attain UDC if there are at most t failures, for each possible value of t. The generalized failure detector we consider reports suspicions of the form "at least k processes in a set S of processes are faulty" (although it does not specify which k are the faulty ones). Such generalized failure detectors may be appropriate when the system can be viewed as consisting of a number of components, and all we can say is that some process in a component is faulty, without being able to say which one it is.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the necessary background, reviewing the formal model, failure detectors, the formal language, and the definition of UDC. In Section 3, we present our analysis in the case that there is no bound on the number of faulty processes. Our proof techniques may be of independent interest, since they make nontrivial use of the knowledge-theoretic tools of [FHMV95] . Re asoning about the knowledge of the processes in the system-particularly, their knowledge of which other agents are faulty-plays a key role in the analysis. In Section 4, we extend this analysis to the case where there is a known bound t on the number of faulty processes; we also introduce our generalized failure detectors. We conclude in Section 5. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Background

2.1
The model
We adopt the familiar model of an asynchronous distributed system. We assume that there is a fixed finite set Proc = {pl , . . . ,p,} of processes with no shared global clock. These processes communicate with one another by passing messages over a completely connected network of channels. Processes fail by crashing and do not recover, but otherwise follow their assigned protocols. There is no bound on the number of processes that may crash. Channels are not reliable. A message that is sent is not necessarily received and, even if it is received, there is no bound on message transmission delay. However, channels do not corrupt messages and they are fair, in the sense that if the same message is sent from p to q infinitely often and q does not crash, then the message is eventually received by q. Processes execute actions in a totally ordered sequence; corresponding to each action is an event which is recorded in the process's history. The events corresponding to p's actions consist of the communication events send,(q, msg) (p sends message msg to q) and recv,(q, msg) (p receives msg from q), internal events of the form dor(o) (p executes action (Y), inib (p initiates a; see Section 2.4), and the special event crash,,, which models the failure of p.
A history for process p, denoted h,,, is a sequence of events corresponding to actions performed by process p. A cut is a tuple of finite process histories, one for each p E Proc. A run is a function from time (which we take to range over the natural numbers, for simplicity) to cuts. If T is a run, we use rs(m) to denote p's history in the cut r(m). A pair (r, m) consisting of a run r and a time m is called a point. We write (r, m) wP (r',m') if VP(m) = ri(m').
We say that a run T' e&ends a point (r, m) if r'(m') = r(m') for all m' 5 m. Thus, r' extends (r,m) if r and r' have the same prefix up to time m.
We assume that a run r satisfies the following.
Rl.
R2.
R3.
R4.
R5.
cess,s histAii.ij~~t$t is, at time 0, e=h pro-49 = (0 9 When we consider failure detectors, we add further conditions to runs. A system is a set of runs. Systems are typically generated by protocols executed in a certain context. Formally, a protocol for process p is a function from finite histories to actions. A joint protocol is a tuple (A,..., P,,) consisting of a protocol for each process in Proc. A run r is consistent with a joint protocol P if for each finite prefix hi = hi * e of pi's history in r, if e is not a receive or crash event, then e is the event corresponding to the action Pi(h:). A contezt for us is simply a bound on the number of processes that can fail and a specification of properties of failure detectors (see Section 2.2; see [FHMV95, FHMV97] for a a more general definition of context). In a given context, a joint protocol generates the system consisting of all the runs satisfying Rl-R5 and the constraints of the context that are consistent with the protocol. We say that a protocol has a certain property if the system it generates has that property.
Failure Detectors
Informally, a failure detector [CT961 is a per-process oracle that emits suspicions regarding other processes' faultiness. These suspicions, in general, are just that. The fact that a process q is suspected by process p's failure detector does not mean that q is in fact faulty. We then can impose various conditions on the accuracy of a failure detector's suspicions and the completeness of these suspicions, that is, whether a process that is faulty is (eventually) suspected.
Bather than model the failure detector with a special tape, as Chandra and Toueg do [CT96], we model the act of p reading its failure detector by the event suspec$,(S), where 5' E hoc.
This event should be interpreted as p's failure detector saying that the processes in S are suspected of being faulty.
At any point (r, m), define Suspects,(r, m) = S if and only if suspect,(S) is the most recent failure-detector event in rP(m). F(r) denotes the faulty processes in run P.
Consider Chandra and Toueg [CT961 define a perfect failure detector as one that satisfies strong completeness and strong accuracy, a strong failure detector bs one that satisfies strong completeness and weak accuracy, and a weak failure detector as one that satisfies weak completeness and weak accuracy. We define ~JI impermanent-strong failure detector as one that satisfies impermanent strong completeness and weak accuracy and an impermanent-weak failure detector as one that satisfies impermanent weak completeness and weak accuracy. We say that R is a has perfect (resp., strong, weak, impermanent-strong, impermanent-weak) failure detectors if for all r E R, strong completeness and strong accuracy (resp., strong completeness and weak accuracy; weak completeness and weak accuracy; impermanent strong completeness and weak accuracy; impermanent weak completeness and weak accuracy) hold.
Chandra and Toueg show that, in many cases of interest, we can convert a failure detector satisfying weak completeness to one satisfying strong completeness, while still preserving accuracy properties; the same holds for weak impermanent completeness and strong impermanent completeness. Thus, we do not consider weak (impermanent) completeness further. Note that in the presence of strong accuracy, we can trivially convert a failure detector that satisfies impermanent strong completeness to one that satisfies strong completeness by always outputting the list of all previously suspected processes. As we show in Section 3, under a minimal assumption that should surely be satisfied in practice, if there is no bound on the number of faults, a failure detector that satisfies weak accuracy must also satisfy strong accuracy. Thus, if there is no bound on the number of faults, then there is essentially no difference between impermanent-strong failure detectors and perfect failure detectors.3
2.3
The Formal Language
Our language for reasoning about distributed coordination involves time and knowledge. The underlying notion of time is linear (so our language extends linear time temporal logic). We find it useful to be able to reason about the past as well as the future. Formally, we start with primitive propositions and close off under Boolean combinations, 0, and the epistemic operators KP for each process p. A formula is true or false relative to a tuple (72, r, m) consisting of a system 72, run r E R, and time m. We write (R,r,m) + cp if the formula cp is true at the point (r,m) in system '72. Among the primitive propositions in the language are send,(q, msg),
and init,( The truth of these primitive propositions is determined by the cut in the obvious way; for example, send,(q, msg) is true at point (r, m) precisely when sendp(q, msg) is 31n the notation of Chandra and Toueg, impermanent-S I S Y P for t = n -1 failures.
an event in p's history component of (r, m) . 09 holds at a point if it holds from that point on in the run. Thus, (72, r, m) b 0~ if and only if (R, r, m') b 'p for all m' 2 m. As usual, we define 09 = ~(7~~0; thus, 0 is the dual of 0. It is easy to see that (72, T, m) + 0y.Y if (R,r,m') + 'p for some m' 1 m. Finally, K,cp is true if cp is true at all the points that p considers possible, given its current history. Formally, (7Z, r, m) + K,cp if and only if (R, r', m') b 'p for all points (r', m') wP (r, m). We say a formula 'p is valid in system R, denoted 77, k 'p, if (R, r, m) + 'p for all points (r, m) in R.
In our analysis, we make particular use of local and stable formulas. A formula 'p is local to process p in system R if at every point p knows whether it is true, that is, if K,cp V K,ycp is valid in R. Thus, all formulas describing a process's local state, for example, send,(q, msg), km;@, msg), crash(p), -and init,( are local to onlv that process. It follows from the properties of kiowledg;! that formulas of the form K,cp are also local to p, since K, (K,cp) V KP(~KP(p) is valid in every system. A stable formula is one that, once true, remains true; that is, 'p is stable in system 72 if cp =k-09 is valid in 72. All of send,(q, msg), req(p, msg), crash(p), and init, are stable.
Distributed Coordination
We are interested in modeling distributed coordination of certain actions among the processes in Proc. The actions may be allocating a resource, delivering multicast messages, or committing a transaction; we are not concerned with the specifics. We are also not concerned here with other requirements such as executing actions in a particular order (e.g., totalorder multicast) or not executing conflicting actions (e.g., consensus). We are interested only in the eventual, distributed execution of these actions. Formally, we assume that each process p has a set A, of coo&nation actions it may want to perform. We further assume that the sets dp and A, are di5 joint for p # q. (Think of the actions in A, as somehow being tagged by p.) We assume that for each action in a E A,, there is a special action of iniliating cr. The corresponding event ini$(a) can appear only in p's history, and can appear at most once in a run. Intuitively, if ini&,(cx) appears in p's history, we would like all the processes in Proc to perform a. The only question is what requirements we should make of actions performed by processes that crash.
Uniform
Distributed Coordina2ion (UDC) of action a occurs if whenever any p' E Proc executes a E dp, then so eventually does every correct Q E hoc. As well, no process performs a E A, unless p initiates it. Formally, UDC of a E A, holds in a system R if the following three conditions hold:
JXX 72 I= ArEproc (d%(a) * ifW4).
Non-Uniform Distributed Coordinalion (nUDC) requires coordination only if the process that performs a is correct. Thus, nUDC of a holds in a system R if DCl, DC3, and the following hold:
The next propositions show that, unlike UDC, nUDC is easy to attain, and that reliable communication is significant for UDC. Chandra and Toueg [CT961 prove a result a&o-gous to Proposition 3.1 for consensus. They show that consensus is achievable with strong failure detectors in a context with at most n -1 failures where communication is reliable. Their algorithm works without change even if we have only impermanent-strong failure detectors and allow n failures. Moreover, their algorithm can be easily modified to deal with unreliable, but fair, communication. Thus, unlike UDC, the reliability of communication has no significant impact on the attainability of consensus.
We next prove what is essentially a converse to Proposition 3.1. Specifically, we show that if processes can perform UDC and there is no bound on the number of possible failures, then they can simulate perfect failure detectors (since under our assumptions, impermanent-strong and perfect failure detectors are equivalent).
Thus, among other things, we need to make precise the notions of "simulating a perfect failure detector" and "no bound on process failures".
"Simulating a perfect failure detector" means that there is a function from process p's histories to events of the form suspec$,(S) such that if these events are inserted into the history, the resulting run satisfies the properties of perfect failure detectors (with respect to these new failure-detector events). Formally, for each run r E R, we construct a run f(r) such that for each process p, we have . where e' = e unless e is of the form s;spec&(S), in which case e' is 3uspect'JS).
In f(r), process p's history is identical to its history in r except that, at each odd step, p's failure detector reports the processes that p knows have crashed at the corresponding point in R. In addition, we relabel the failure detector events in r so that they are not counted as failure detector events in f(r) (and thus do not need to be considered when we show that 'R! has perfect failure detectors). Now define system R' = {f(r) : T E R}. Proposition 3.2 shows that the failure detector in R' is perfect, under suitable assumptions. The notion of simulation implicitly underlying this specific definition for perfect failure detectors is more general that the notion of reduction used in [CT96, CHT96] . For example, in these papers, it is shown that if consensus can be solved by means of a failure detector (and there are at most t < n/2 failures), then that failure detector can be transformed to a particular failure detector called OW (for eventually weak), which satisfies eventual weak accuracy and weak completeness; see [CT961 for the precise definition. Since consensus can be solved with OW failure detectors, these failure detectors are viewed as the weakest failure detectors for consensus. It follows immediately from our simulation that if UDC can be attained using some failure detector, then that failure detector can be transformed in a trivial sense to a perfect failure detector. We just ignore the failure detector altogether and use the transformation above. However, our notion of simulation does not depend on using failure detectors to attain UDC. Thus, it applies in situations where the reductions of [CT96, CHT96] do not.
Consider the following four properties of R, which formalize some standard assumptions.
Al.
A2.
A3.
A4.
A5t.
If there exists a run in R where all the processes in S crash, and (r, m) is a point in R such that no process in hoc -S has crashed, then there is a run r' extending (r, m) such that F(r') = S.
If F(rl) = F(rz) and (rl,m) N,, (r~,m) for all q 4 F(rl), then there are extensions r; and r; of (rl, m) and (rz, m), respectively, such that (r;,m') -Q (r&,m') for all m' 2 m and all q # F(n), and all the processes in F(rl) crash by timem+linr; and&
The formula K,init,(a) is insensitive to failure by q, where a formula cp local to q is said to be insensitive to failure by q if for all runs T, r' E R, if r:(m)) = rp(m) . cm&, then ('R, r, m) k cp iff (R, r', m') + cp.
If cp is a stable formula local to some process p in R that is insensitive to failure by p and there is some S C Proc such that (R,r,m) t= A OES +Q, then there exists a point (r', m) such that (a) r:(m) = r,(m) for q E S, (b)for q # S, there is a prefix h of r,(m) (not necessarily strict) such that r:(m) is either h or ha crash,, and r;(m) = h. cm& only if cmsh,, E rq(m), (4 F&r',4 I= 1~.
For every S g Proc such that ISI 5 t, there exists a run r E R such that F(r) = S.
Al essentially says that process failures are independent of other events. If it is possible for the processes in S to crash, this may happen at any time in any run. A2 says that the actions of non-faulty processes are not affected by those of faulty processes from whom they hear nothing. Thus, if two points (r,m) and (r', m) are indistinguishable to the correct processes, then there axe extensions of these runs that continue to be indistinguishable, in which they hear nothing further from the faulty processes. A3 says that a process cannot learn that p initiated Q just by crashing. A4 says, among other things, that if each of the processes in S considers -Q possible, where Q is a stk ble failure-insensitive formula local to some process, then there is a point where -Q is true that all the processes in S simultaneously consider possible. We discuss A4 in more detail below. A5t captures the assumption that at most t processes may fail. Thus, A5, captures the assumption that there is no bound on process failures.
In the presence of Al, if there is no bound on the number of failures, strong failure detectors are perfect failure detectors. Proposition 3.2: If R satisfies Al and A5,,-1 (or A5,,), then R satisfies weak accuracy ifl R satisfies strong accumcy.
It follows from Proposition 3.2 that if 7?, satisfies Al and A5 ,,-l, then R has strong failure detectors iff R has perfect failure detectors.
Al and A3 are properties we would expect to hold of all systems generated by protocols in the contexts of interest to us. A2 implicitly assumes that there is no information relevant to the system beyond what is in the processes' states. For example, suppose each process had a message buffer, such that once a message was in q's buffer, then as long as q did not crash, q would eventually receive the message. Consider two runs r1 and ~2 such that (~1, m) w4 (~2, m), Wl 1 = F(Q), and F(Q) consists of sIl processes other than q. Moreover, suppose that there is a message msg in q's buffer in (~1, m), but not in (~2, m). By A2, there are extensions of r; and r; of (~1, m) and (~2, m) such that all processes other than q crash in round mfl in both r; and T-L and (T:, m') mP (ri, m') for all m' 2 m. But this is impossible, since q receives msg in T; but not in Ni.
Assumption A4 is perhaps the least standard assumption. A4 assumes that processes are essentially using a full-information protocol (FIP) [Coa86, FHMV95 to generate 7Z and places some restrictions on the information they can get from failure detectors. With an FIP, when a process p sends a message to q, it sends complete information about its state. To see why we need FIPs for A4, suppose that neither p nor q have crashed at (r,m), and at some time q sends a message msg to p', which p' receives. Then p' sends p a message saying crash(q) V send,@, msg), which p receives by time m. Thus, (R,r,m) k K,(crash(q) V sendq(p', msg))A+&,(crash(q))A4C,(send,(p', msg)).
Then there cannot exist a point (T', m') such that, (a) r;(m)) = rp(m), (b) ri(m') is a prefix of vq(m), and (c) (R, r', m') + -sendq(p', msg). If that were the case, then necessarily (R, T', m') b crash(q), because K,(crash(q) V sendq(p', msg)) holds at (R, r,m), violating the assumption that it is a prefix of rP(m). This example violates A4 because p' did not tell p all it, knew, which is precisely what cannot happen with a full-information protocol. Assuming that 77, is generated by an FIP, under reasonable assumptions about failure detectors, 77, should satisfy A4. To see why, given (T, m), we can construct, run r' as follows. First note that (R, r, 0) + lcp, for cp stable and local to p, for otherwise cp would be true at. sll points in R and so would K,cp. So let m,, be the first time in r where cp becomes true. Let S E Proc be the processes that do not know cp at (r, m). If processes are following a full-information protocol, there can be no chain of messages from p to a process q E S between times mp and m in r, for if there were, q would know 'p at (r, m).' For each process q E Proc, ' There is a message chain from p to q between mP and m > m,, if there is a sequence of messages msgl, . . . , msgL and processes ~1,. . , pk+l such that (a) msgi is sent by pi to pi+1 and is received, (b) pi+1 sends msgL+l after receiving msgr, (c) p = PI, (d) p = pL+l, (e) p sends msgl at or after mp, and (f) p receives msgE+l at or before m. If the processes follow a full-information protocol, then pi+l knows everything let mp be the least time at or before m at, which there is a message chain from p to q in r between mp and m,, if there is such a time; otherwise, we take m, = m + 1. Note that for q E S, we have mp = m + 1. We then construct r' so that r:(m') = rq(m') for m' 2 mp -1; if q does not crash in r between times mp and m inclusive, then rs(m') = rq(m, -1) for m 1: m,; otherwise, rP(m') = rq(m, -1). CM& for m' > mp. By construction, we have rP(m) = r:(m) for q E S. For q' 4 S, we have that ant is either 7-d Cm9 -1) or r9f(mq -1) . CM+.
The reason we need to add cmsh 1 is that the failure detector of some process q E S m!ght report that q' fails in r. Since VP(m) = r:(m), if q's failure detector is accurate, it must be the case that q' also fails in r'. Assuming the failure detectors are "ressonable" (in particular, cannnot say something like "either p has crashed or p received the message"), then r' should indeed be a run in R. Note that if (72, r, Since 'p is insenstive to failure by p, we have that (R, r', m) /= ycp. Thus, (r', m) satisfies the requirements of A4.
Theorem 3.4 shows that if R attains UDC and satisfies Al-A4 and A5, (or A5,-1) then the system 78 has perfect failure detectors. In light of this discussion, our result can be viewed as saying that under some relatively innocuous assumptions (Al-A3), if there is no bound on the number of failures (A5,,) and the processes are telling each other as much as they can (A4), then attaining UDC is tantamount to having perfect failure detectors. Before proving that, we provide a characterization of the facts that, must be known by a process before it can perform a coordination action cy. Specifically, a process must know that if there are any correct. processes at, all, then one of these knows that (Y has been initiated. Although the proposition is phrased in terms of the knowledge of the initiating process p (and this is all we need for our proofs), a straightforward extension of the argument shows that it holds for every process p' that performs cr. 
A Cl-crash(q))).
Theorem 3.4 Suppose R is the system genemted by a protocol that attains UDC, R satisfies Al-A4 and A&, (or A&,-l) and in each run T E R, if p is correct in r, then p initiates actions infinitely often in r (i.e., infinitely many events of the form initp(a) appear in p's history in T). Then the system 'R' generated as above is one with perfect failure detectors. A generalized failure detector reports that (it suspects that) at least k processes in a set S are faulty. As we discussed earlier, such generalized failure detectors are appropriate when processes can observe faulty behavior in some component(s) without being able to tell which processes in the component are sctually faulty. We model such generalized suspicions by using events of the form suspect,,(S, k). We are interested in generalized failure detectors that give useful information.
Of course, what is "useful" may depend on the application. Given a system R and an upper bound of t on the number of failures that may occur in a run of R, we say that suspectr(S, k) is a t-useful failure-detector event for r if (a) F(r) E S and (b) n -IS] > min(t,n -1) -k (or, equivalently, k > PI -n + min(t, n -1). Note that if p learns at the point (r, m) that there are k faulty processes in S and n -IS] > min(t,n -1) -k, then p can conclude that, if there are any correct processes at all in r, then one of the processes in P~OC -S is correct at (r, m) (although it may not know which one). Just knowing that some processes in a set are correct is not in general useful. For example, if t < n, then all processes know that at least n-t processes in Proc are correct. As we shall see, what makes this fact useful is that F(r) 5 S, even though p may not know this.
A generalized failure detector in R is t-useful if for all r E 'R and processes p, we have: Genemlized Strong Accumcy: if suspect,(S, k) is in rp(n then there is a subset S' C S such that IS'] = k and for all q E S', we have that cm& is in &4.
Genemlized Impermanent Strong Completeness: if p is correct, then there is a t-useful failure-detector event for r in rp(m), for some m.
Note that it is trivial to construct a t-useful failure detector in a context with at most t failures if t < n/2: repeatedly output ($0) for every S C Proc with IS] = t. Suspecting no processes in any subset S trivially satisfies generalized strong accuracy, and in every run r at least one t-sized subset of Proc must contain F(r). Whenever F(r) C S, then (SO) is a t-useful failure-detector event.
Also note that if suspect,(S, k) is an (n-l)-useful or n-useful failure-detector event, then we must have iz]h;v:,ksince the only way to have k > ISI -1 is = IS]. Thus, we can easily convert an nuseful or (n -l)-useful generalized failure detector to a perfect failure detector, by just reporting events of the form suspect,(S) every time the generalized failure detector reports suspect,(S, k) with IS] = k. Conversely, we can easily convert a perfect failure detector to an n-useful (and hence (n-l)-useful) failure detector. Given a history for process p, we simply replace each event suspect,(S) by the event suspect,(S', k), where S' is the union of S together with all the sets that appeared in prior failure detector events in the history, and k = IS']. It is easy to see that this gives us a useful failure detector. Thus, the following result generalizes Proposition 3.1 and Gopal and Toueg's result.
Proposition
4.1: Them is a protocol that attains UDC in a contezt with a bound oft on the number of failures and with t-useful generalized failure detectors.
We want a converse to Proposition 4.1 that generalizes Theorem 3.4. We show that if processes can perform UDC in a context with a bound t on the number of failures, then t-useful generalized failure detectors can be simulated in that context. Given system R, construct system R' as follows.
Fix an order SO, . . . , Szn -1 of the subsets of P~oc. For each run r E R, let 7?! = {f(r) : P E 7?,} where f(r) is constructed exactly as before, with just one minor change:
l if rr(m + 1) = rr,(rn) . e, then f (r)p(2rn + 1) = f(r),(lm)~suspect,(St, k), where 1 is the length of the history r,(m+l) mod 2" and k = max I{k' : ('I?., r, m) l= K,(k processes in S have crashed)}1 and f(r),,(2m + 2) = f(r),(2m + 1) . e', where e' is as before.
In the full paper we prove the following. Theorem 4.2: Suppose R is the system genemted by a protocol that attains CIDC in a contezt with at most t failures, R satisfies Al-A4
and A&, and in each run r E R, if p is correct in r then p initiates actions infinitely often in r. Then the system R' genemted as above is one with t-useful genemlized failure detectors.
Conclusions
We have shown that the problem of Uniform Distributed Coordination in asynchronous systems varies in its complexity both with communication guarantees and with the number of failures that must be 
Proof:
We proceed just as in the proof of Proposition 2.1, except that before performing the action CY, a process simply sends a message to all other processes telling them to perform CY and inform all other processes if they have not already done so. More precisely, if init,, is in p's history, p goes into a special UDC((r) state. If a process is in a UDC(cr) state, it sends an a-message to all processes and then performs Q. If a process receives an f3 message, it goes into a UDC-state if it has not already done so. Since a process q performs cz only after sending out an a-message to all processes, if communication is reliable, q knows that all other correct processes will receive the message, and thus also perform CX, even if q crashes. 1 Proposition 3.1: There is a protocol that attains UDC in a context with impermanent-strong failure detectors.
Proof: The proof is similar in spirit to that of Proposition 2.1. Whenever a process wants to attain UDC of action q it goes into a special UDC(cr) state. If a process p is in a UDC(a) state, it sends an a-message repeatedly to aJl other processes telling them to perform CY and reads its failure detector repeatedly. Process p performs (Y if, for every process q, p receives an acknowledgment from q to its a-message or p's failure detector says that q is faulty. However, p continues to send a-messages even after performing (Y, until it has received an acknowledgment for all processes (which may never happen).6 Every time a process q receives an o-message from p, q sends an acknowledgment to p; it also goes into a UDC(cx) state if it has not already done so.
To show that this protocol attains UDC, it suffices to show that, in every run, (1) if a process p is in a UDC(a) state, then p will eventually perform CY or crash and (2) if p performs (Y then every other correct process performs cr. To see that (1) holds, suppose that p is in a UDC(a) state in run r. Then p repeatedly sends an a-message in T, so if p is correct, then eventually every correct process q will get p's a-message and acknowledge it. Since a correct process sends an acknowledgment for each a-message it receives, R5 ensures that p will eventually get an acknowledgment from every correct process. Since p has a impermanent-strong failure detector, it will also eventually suspect every faulty process. Thus, it will perform CY, according to the protocol above.
To see that (2) holds, first observe that since p has a weakly accurate failure detector, there is some correct process, say q*, that p never suspects. If R satisfies Al and A&,-I (or A5,,), then R satisfies weak accuracy iff R satisfies strong accuracy.
Proof: Let R satisfy Al, A5,-1, and weak accuracy. If R does not satisfy strong accuracy, then there is a point (r, m) such that suspect,(S, k) E rp(m), q E S, and q has not failed in S. Let S' = Proc -{q}. By A5 ,,-I, there is a run r' where all the processes in S' fail. Thus, by Al, there is a run r" extending (r,m) such that all the processes in S' fail in r". Thus, q is the only correct process in r". By weak accuracy, we must have that q is never suspected as faulty in r", contradicting the assumption that it is in fact suspected by p. m Proposition 3.3:
Zf 'R satisfies Al, AZ, and A4,
ProoE Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
A fJ-uash(q))).
Then there must be a point (?, m') wp (r, m) such that
We have (R,r',m') k /\4eF(rlj TK,init,(cy). Since p knows that it initiated (Y at (rl, m'), we must have p E F(r'). Moreover, F(r') # Proc. By A4, there exists a point (r2,m') such that (r2, m') y (r', m') for q E proc-F(r ') and (R, r2, m') j= yinit,( By Al, there exists a run r3 extending (r2,m') such that F(v3) = F(r').
Since r3 extends (?,m'), we must have r,'(m') = r%(m)) for alI q E PrOC -F[z'). By A2, there exist runs ~~ and Y' extending T and TV, respectively, such that I," = ~$(m") for m" > m'. Moreover, all the processes in F(r') (and, in particular, p) for q E Proc-F(r').
This gives the desired contradiction to (1). m Theorem 3.4: Suppose R is the system genemted by a protocol that attains UDC, 'R satisfies Al-Ad and A5, (or A&,-I) and in each run T E R, if p is correct in r, then p initiates actions infinitely often in T (i.e., infinitely many events of the form ini&, appear in p's history in r). Then the system 72' genemted as above is one with perfect failure detectors.
Proof: It is immediate from the construction that p crashes in (T, m) iff p crashes in (f(T), 2m). It easily follows that p's failure detector satisfies strong accuracy. To show that it satisfies strong completeness, suppose that p is correct and q fails in run f(T) E R' and hence a.lso in run T E R. Since p initiates actions infinitely often in R, there must be some action a initiated by p in f(v) after q has failed. Since R satisfies UDC, by DCl, p must eventually perform (Y in run T, say at time m. Moreover, by DC2, p knows that, for each process q' (and, in particular, q), q' must eventually either crash or must perform a. Using DC3, it easily follows that we must have (R, T, m) b 
Suppose that (R, T, m) 1 q lK,crash(q). Since q crashes in T before p initiates cy, we also have (R, r, m) k yK,init,(cr). Thus, there must exist a point (Al, m') wP (T, m) such that (R, rl, m') + ~crash(q)A~K,K,init,(cu). Since K,init,(a) is stable, local to q, and (by A3) insensitive to failures by q, by A4, there must exist a point (r2, m') wP (?, m') such that I," is a prefix of I:
and (R, r2,m') + lK,init,(cr). Since $(m') isaprefixofr:(m'), wealso have (R,r",m') /= -crash(q).
This means (r2, m') wP (T, m) and (R, r2, m') b -crash(q) A TK,init,(cr).
By A5,-1 (or the stronger A5,) and Al, there is a run r3 extending (r2, m') such that alI processes except q fail in r3. Of course, (T-~, m') wP (T, m) and (Rlr3Tm') I= Aq~~proc-~q) Ocrash(q') A lK,init,(cr)
A O-crash(q) .
But this contradicts (2). 1 Proposition 4.1: There is a protocol that attains UDC in a context with a bound oft on the number of failures and with t-useful genemlized failure detectors.
Proof: Whenever a process wants to attain UDC of action (Y, it goes into a special UDC(cx) state. If a process p is in a UDC(cx) state, it sends an a-message repeatedly to all other processes telling them to perform (Y and reads its failure detector repeatedly. Process p performs cy at time m if, by time m, (a) its failure detector reports suspect,(S,k), (b) it has received messages from all the processes in Proc -S acknowledging (Y, and (c) n -ISI > min(t, n -1) -Ic. Process p continues to send a-messages to q E S until it either receives an acknowledgment from q or knows q to be faulty. A process that receives an a-message from p sends an acknowledgment to p and goes into a UDC(a) state if it has not already done so.
To show that this protocol attains UDC, again it suffices to show that, in every run, (1) if a process p is in a UDC(cx) state, then p will eventually perform cy or crash and (2) if p performs (Y then every other correct process performs cy. For (l), suppose that p is in a UDC(a) state in run T. Then p repeatedly sends an a-message in T, so if p is correct, then eventually every correct process q will get it and acknowledge it. Since a process q acknowledges p's a-message each time it gets it, by R5, p will eventually get an acknowledgment from every correct process. Since p has a t-useful failure detector, if it is correct in T, there will be a t-useful failure-detector event say suspect *( S, k) , in Tp(m) for some m > m,. Since p eventually gets acknowledgments from all the processes in Proc -S (since these, at least, are correct in r), it will eventually perform (Y, according to the algorithm.
To see that (2) holds, the arguments for (1) show that if p performs (Y as a result of the failure-detector event suspect,(S, k), all the processes in Proc-S have received an (Y message (and hence are in a UDC((Y) state) and Proc -S contains at least one correct process, say q, if there are any correct processes in T. Since q continues to send a-messages to all processes, all the correct processes in T will eventually be in a UDC(CX) state. It then follows from (1) that all the correct processes will perform a. I
